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Participants in a war ﬁnance session of the 1917 American Economic Association meet-
ings deliberated options for ﬁscal strategy during World War I (WWI). O.M.W. Sprague (1917)
and his discussants commended the “English method” of ﬁnance, characterized by contemporary
taxation of factor incomes to ﬁnance wartime government spending. The English method of war
ﬁnance differs from the tax smoothing model which proposes debt ﬁnance of emergency (i.e., war)
expenditures; see S. Rao Aiyagari, Albert Marcet, Thomas J. Sargent, and Juha Sepp¨ al¨ a (2002).
This paper argues that U.K. WWI ﬁscal policy followed the English method identiﬁed by
Sprague (1917) and his discussants and revived by the U.S. to ﬁnance the Korean War (see Lee
E. Ohanian (1997)). During WWI, U.K. ﬁscal policy adopted the “McKenna rule” named for
Reginald McKenna, Chancellor of the Exchequer (1915 – 16). McKenna presented his ﬁscal rule
to Parliament in June 1915. The McKenna rule guided U.K. ﬁscal policy for the rest of WWI and
the interwar period. We draw on narrative evidence to show that motivation for the McKenna rule
came from a desire to treat labor and capital fairly and equitably, not pass WWI costs onto future
generations, and commit to a debt retirement path and higher taxes. However, a permanent income
model suggests the McKenna rule adversely affected the U.K. because a higher debt retirement
rate produces a lower consumption-output ratio. A 1916 – 37 sample supports this prediction.
I. A Narrative of U.K. Fiscal Policy during and after WWI
Contrary to the initial expectations of U.K. policymakers, the persistent and costly nature
of WWI was apparent when McKenna became Chancellor of the Exchequer in May 1915.1 Rather
than rely on debt ﬁnance, McKenna’s September 1915 budget committed the U.K. to a debt retire-
ment path and higher taxes as demanded by Parliament and The City of London. A commitment to
1a debt retirement path came from a belief that owners of government bonds should not proﬁt from
WWI and that future generations should not have to pay for WWI, as argued by Pigou (1916).
Nonetheless, there was skepticism about McKenna’s proposed ﬁscal rule. McKenna had several
opportunities to convince Parliament and The City of London that he was committed to his ﬁscal
arithmetic. The ﬁrst, in the summer of 1915, stressed the need for higher taxes to meet anticipated
temporary increases in government expenditures: “::: we shall have to ﬁnd further money, and it
is perfectly open to anybody to calculate what. They only have to reckon the time when ::: the
mere interest on [loans] will have exhausted all our surplus revenue, then ::: [w]e must raise fresh
taxes” McKenna (Hansard (Commons), June 21, 1915, col 1000).
The McKenna rule restrained U.K. ﬁscal policy during and after WWI by tying “interest”
to all ﬁnancial ﬂows on government debt. In this case, interest was the sum of coupon payments,
rolled over maturing debt, and provision for future debt retirement. The last of these, a “sinking
fund”, greatly added to the budget; Wormell (2000, p. 202, pp. 662 – 698). For example, McKenna
projected interest of ﬁve percent in the April 1916 budget when consuls paid below four percent.
McKenna also used the April 1916 budget to clarify further his ﬁscal policy. In that budget,
he explained that “surplus revenue” referred to “ordinary” peacetime primary budget surpluses.
Thus, McKenna committed post-armistice ﬁscal policy to peacetime budget surpluses, while ex-
cluding temporary “extraordinary” revenue and expenditure.
Besides committing to a debt retirement path, the McKenna rule required revenue to satisfy
the government budget constraint. Under the McKenna rule, the Chancellor chose a debt path,
which implied a debt retirement rate, ·t. Next, the Chancellor selected among possible revenue
sources to meet government expenditures needs, but McKenna did not commit future policy to a
speciﬁc tax. However, Daunton (2002) argues that the tax burden fell heaviest on capital because
2U.K. policymakers wanted to provide a “just mix” of current taxation and debt. This just mix aimed
to strike a balance between fairness and equity to limit rents (i.e., war proﬁts) earned by capital.
McKenna revealed his preference to place the heaviest tax burden on owners of capital in
the September 1915 and April 1916 budgets. The September 1915 budget saw higher statutory
income tax rates combined with lower exemption limits, and the introduction of the extraordinary
Excess Proﬁt Duty (EPD); Peden (2000, pp. 90 – 91). The EPD was intended to offset temporary
wartime expenditures. It was set at 50 percent in the September 1915 budget, 60 percent in the
April 1916 budget, and raised to 80 percent by 1918 prior to being phased out in 1921.2
Capital took the brunt of the tax burden, especially after WWI, according to ﬁgure 1. It
plots mean ¿K;t (excluding the EPD) and labor income tax rates, ¿N;t, from 1916 to 1937. Subse-
quent to 1920, ¿K;t is 9.5 percentage points larger than ¿N;t, on average. This indicates U.K. ﬁscal
policymakers preferred to adjust ¿K;t to satisfy the government budget constraint, given ·t.
McKenna’s tenure as Chancellor ended with the Liberal government collapse in December
1916. Thus, it fell to others to maintain the McKenna rule. McKenna’s immediate replacement,
Bonar Law (Chancellor 1916 – 19) and his successor Austen Chamberlain (Chancellor 1919 – 21),
explicitly cited the McKenna rule as the basis of ﬁscal policy; Wormell (2000, pp. 348 – 349, p.
393). Law and Chamberlain promised to continue to ﬁnance the sinking fund. Chamberlain also
oversaw the expected phase out of the EPD with the end of WWI. Since the peacetime McKenna
rule required other revenue sources, there was a shift from proﬁt to capital income taxes to meet
the revenue shortfall. This shift was accelerated by tax reform in 1920. Subsequent Chancellors,
Robert Horne (1921 – 22), Stanley Baldwin (1922 – 23), Philip Snowden (1924, 1929 – 31), Win-
ston Churchill (1924 – 29), and Neville Chamberlain (1923 – 24, 1931 – 37), used their discretion
to ﬁne-tune debt retirement while operating within the conﬁnes of the McKenna rule.
3II. The McKenna Rule Accounting Exercise
This section uses the McKenna rule restrictions to study the implications for the path of
debt retirement. Begin with the government budget constraint
Dt+1 + ¿C;tCt + ¿N;twtNt + ¿K;t(Yt ¡ wtNt) + ¿P;tP¤;t ¸ Gt + (1 + rD;t)Dt + Trt; (1)
where Dt+1 is the (real) stock of debt, ¿C;t is the tax rate on consumption Ct, ¿N;t is levied on the
wage bill (wtNt), ¿K;t is levied on net proﬁts (Yt ¡ wtNt), ¿P;t is the EPD rate on proﬁts net of
average proﬁts P¤;t, Gt is total government expenditure, rD;t is the (real) return on Dt, and Trt
denote transfers.3 Note that Gt = GO;t + GW;t, where GO;t and GW;t denote ordinary peacetime
and temporary wartime government expenditures, respectively.
Explicit in McKenna’s statement to Parliament in June 1915 was that ﬁnancial ﬂows on
debt, which included the provision for future debt retirement (i.e., the sinking fund), must be paid
out of the ordinary peacetime surplus. Under the McKenna rule, ordinary peacetime revenue was
TO;t ´ ¿C;tCt+¿N;twtNt+¿K;t(Yt¡wtNt)¡Trt, which made TO;t¡GO;t the ordinary peacetime
primary surplus. Thus, McKenna’s June 1915 statement is given by the inequality
·tDt + rD;tDt · TO;t ¡ GO;t; 0 · ·t · 1; (2)
where ·tDt represents resources earmarked for debt repayment.
The inequality (2) and the government budget constraint (1) restrict the debt path of the
McKenna rule. This follows from imposing equality on (2) and combining it with (1) to obtain
Dt+1 = (1 ¡ ·t)Dt + GW;t ¡ ¿P;tP¤;t; (3)
which is the McKenna rule law-of-motion of government debt. Note that new debt was issued only
to ﬁnance extraordinary spending net of wartime EPDs, but ·t dictated the debt retirement rate.
4The McKenna rule parameter ·t determines the persistence of the government debt process,
given movements in net extraordinary wartime expenditures. As ·t ! 0, the government debt
process (3) approximates a random walk driven by ﬂuctuations in net wartime spending. In this
case, debt dynamics are in accord with predictions of the tax-smoothing model. If ·t > 0, tax
smoothing no longer approximates the ﬁscal outcomes that arise under the McKenna rule.
III. The McKenna Rule and Permanent Income
The McKenna rule had implications for the U.K. economy besides driving the path of debt
retirement and the allocation of the tax burden. This section shows that ·t, which controlled the
debt retirement path, was forward-looking. This indicates that the McKenna rule acted to smooth
the debt retirement path, rather than smooth, say, ¿K;t. Another implication of the McKenna rule
is that it had an adverse effect on the U.K. economy. An example is presented in this section that
uses a permanent income model to depict one such effect.
We establish the forward-looking nature of the McKenna rule with a ﬁrst-order Taylor
expansion around its steady state of the budget constraint (1) and the McKenna rule law of motion
of debt (3). Equate the resulting linear difference equations to obtain
e ·t =
1 ¡ ·¤













































































where, for example, e ·t = (·t ¡ ·¤)=·¤ (i.e., the deviation of ·t from its steady state ·¤), e °y;t
is the deviation of output growth, Yt=Yt¡1, from its steady state °¤









D), Et is the expectations
operator given date t information, L is the lag operator (xt¡1 = Lxt), and the EPD is ignored.
The present value relation (4) shows that ·t was forward-looking in output growth, the
consumption-output ratio (i.e., permanent income), unit labor costs, returns on government debt,
government spending (which includes extraordinary government expenditures), and consumption,
labor income, and capital income tax rates. Note ·t rises (falls) if permanent income, labor’s share
of income, or tax rates (the return on government debt or ordinary government expenditures) is
expected to be higher in the future. Thus, debt retirement was accelerated in response, say, to
higher real economic activity or an anticipated increase in future taxes.
McKenna rule debt retirement smoothing had implications for the U.K. economy. Consider
a household with additive log utility that is separable in consumption and leisure. We construct a
permanent income decision rule by linearizing the household budget constraint and Euler equation
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y = (1 ¡ ·¤)=°¤
y, Hy is total household income, T is the household tax bill, C¤
°;y(L) and
C¤
r(L) are ﬁnite-order polynomials, ¯¤
r = ¯=r¤
y, and ¯ 2 (0; 1) is the household discount factor.
The permanent income decision rule (5) is standard, except for the quasi-difference opera-
tor, 1¡·¤
yL, and ·t¡1. For example, an increase in net permanent income (of taxes) raises (C=Y )t.








Thus, households cut current consumption (relative to income) to save more to have resources to
pay the anticipated increase in future taxes implied by accelerated debt retirement.
6The U.K. data supports this prediction of the permanent income decision rule (5). The
evidence is found in ﬁgure 2, which presents a scatter plot of (1 ¡ ·¤
yL)(C=Y )t and ·t¡1 for
the 1916 – 1937 sample. The former series relies on calibrating ·¤
y, which equals (1 ¡ ·¤)=°¤
y,
to 0.9477, where sample means yield ·¤ = 0:0468 and °¤
y = 1:0058. We combine the budget
constraint (1) and McKenna rule law of motion (3) to obtain a time series for ·t.4
Figure 2 shows that (1¡·¤
yL)(C=Y )t (vertical axis) and ·t¡1 (horizontal axis) are inversely
related for a 1916 – 37 sample. The correlation is ¡0:64, which is nearly 1.65 times larger than
the correlation of (1 ¡ ·¤
yL)(C=Y )t with its own lag. The lower right corner of ﬁgure 2 contains
WWIobservationsthatindicate (C=Y )t fellwhiletheMcKennarule producedhighdebtretirement
rates. This was followed by a post-armistice recovery in (C=Y )t, but lower debt retirement rates
immediately after WWI (observations in the upper left corner of ﬁgure 2). In the early 1920s, the
U.K. increased the pace of debt retirement and observations in the center left of ﬁgure 2 also reveal
that (1 ¡ ·¤
yL)(C=Y )t dropped. Thus, ﬁgure 2 points to an inverse relationship between U.K.
economic activity and the debt retirement rates produced by the McKenna rule.
IV. Conclusion
During WWI and the interwar period, the U.K. employed the McKenna rule to conduct
ﬁscal policy. The McKenna rule committed the U.K. to a debt retirement path, which was forward-
looking, and implied it was smoothed. In the English method tradition of war ﬁnance, the U.K.
taxed capital to retire debt and to achieve a balance between fairness and equity. The prediction
that real activity is lower in response to higher past debt retirement rates is supported by WWI
and interwar U.K. data. James M. Nason and Shaun P. Vahey (2007) provide evidence that the
McKenna rule also contributed to the U.K. depression of the 1920s.
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FOOTNOTES
1. McKenna estimated that the war cost the U.K. government $3 million per day in the June 1915
budget, yet government revenues were less than $0:8 million; see Hirst and Allen (1926, p. 57).
2. Firm proﬁts greater than $100 of the 1912 – 14 average were liable for the EPD.
3. During WWI and the interwar period, transfers were a negligible part of U.K. budgets.
4. Charles F. Feinstein (1972) and Brian R. Mitchell (1988) are data sources. Norbert Janssen
kindly supplied the U.K. government debt data (see Norbert Janssen, Charles Nolan, and Ryland
Thomas (2002)), but we note concerns Hall and Sargent (1997) and Daunton (2002, pp. 128 – 132)
raise about measurement of interest costs in the national income accounts.








Figure 1. Mean Capital and Labor Income Tax Rates, 1916-37
 
 




























Figure 2. Permanent Income and the McKenna Rule, 1916-37
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